Children are sometimes viewed as a method of insuring against disability and providing income after retirement, especially in developing countries with limited markets for credit and insurance. But how do children decide on how much care to provide to their parents in old age, particularly in families with many children? This paper takes a noncooperative view of family decision-making and estimates best response functions for individual physical and …nancial contributions as a function of siblings' contributions. I account for the endogeneity of siblings' contributions by using siblings'characteristics as instrumental variables. By estimating these decisions as part of a two-stage game that includes a migration decision, I also consider the impact of migration on elderly care. I …nd evidence that children's …nancial contributions function as strategic complements while their time contributions operate as strategic substitutes, suggesting that giving may be based on both strategic bequest and public good motivations. In addition, the results from a simulation generating an exogenous switch in child's migrant status show a likely decrease in time and …nancial contributions for most elderly parents.
Introduction
Children are sometimes viewed as a method of insuring against disability and providing income after retirement, especially in developing countries with limited markets for credit and insurance. By the time parents have reached an age where they require assistance, however, it is their children that must decide on the distribution of responsibility of caring for their elderly parents. How do children decide on how much care to provide to their parents in old age, particularly in families with many children? The country of focus is Mexico, where the lure of international migration to the U.S. is strong given the possibility of earning a higher income and thus potentially contributing more …nancially to the elderly parent. At the same time, in most cases the decision to migrate substantially limits the migrant's ability to visit his family in Mexico and thus prohibits him from acting as personal care-giver for the elderly parent.
While there is an extensive literature on migrant remittances, few papers have addressed the speci…c issue of migrant transfers to parents in the home country. One example is Lucas and Stark (1985) who …nd that migrants with wealthier parents contribute relatively more to their parents relative to migrants with poorer parents, a result suggestive of the possibility of intervivos transfers and/or a bequest motive. More recently, Alaimo (2006) considers whether parents of migrant children are better o¤ in terms of time and money transfers reative to parents of non-migrants. While she …nds that parents with migrant children are better o¤ in terms of …nancial assistance, because the units of analysis in her study are parents, it is not possible to fully examine the behavior of migrant and non-migrant children within the family. 1 This paper proposes a deeper analysis of intrafamily resource allocation by focusing on children's behavior toward their parents. I treat elderly care contributions in terms of time and money as the outcome of a non-cooperative 1 Alaimo (2006) uses the same data set as the one employed in this paper, but restricts the sample to parents with no children living at home. In addition, she does not examine the intensive margin of time assistance, i.e. the number of hours of help received by elderly parents.
2 game among children. The game is made up of two stages where agents decide whether or not to migrate in the …rst stage and make contributions to elderly parents in terms of time and money in the second. From this perspective, I estimate best response functions for physical and …nancial care conditional on migration as functions of contributions made by other siblings. This analysis allows us to determine whether siblings'contributions function as strategic substitutes, implying a negative relationship between siblings'contributions, or strategic complements, in which an increase in one child's contribution is met with an increase in that of his sibling.
Estimating the best response functions is particularly interesting because it sheds light on both theoretical and policy questions. First, it is valuable because it allows us to asses the impact of children's migration on the care of parents remaining in Mexico. If siblings' time contributions are strategic substitutes, then the migration of one child and the reduction in time contribution that it necessarily induces would be o¤set by siblings in the home country who would compensate for the absent sibling by increasing their own time contributions.
On the other hand, if siblings' contributions are strategic complements, one child's move abroad would result not only in the reduction in time contribution of the absent sibling, but also a reduction in time contributions by other siblings.
As one child in the family migrates, he may also increase his …nancial contribution to the elderly parent via remittances. If siblings' …nancial contributions are strategic substitutes, then his siblings' money contributions in the home country would fall as a result. However, if siblings'…nancial contributions are strategic complements, then siblings would raise their …nancial contributions to the parents in response.
Thus, if both …nancial and time contributions are strategic substitutes, the e¤ects of one child's migration on the …nancial and physical care of an elderly parent would tend to be dampened by the strategic responses of his siblings.
If instead both …nancial and time contributions are strategic complements, the e¤ects of migration would tend to be ampli…ed. In the event the results are mixed-for example, if …nancial contributions are strategic complements and time 3 contributions are strategic substitutes-then the results for elderly contributions will depend on the relative magnitudes of the parameter estimates describing individual time and …nancial contributions. In this paper, I present an exercise to determine the overall e¤ects of migration on elderly time and …nancial contributions by simulating the equilibrium contributions to the elderly parent when all children are non-migrants as well as the counterfactual when one child exogenously migrates to the U.S.
The best response functions are also of particular interest in light of their theoretical implications pointing to competing models of family interaction. While the economics literature is largely silent about the intrafamily allocation of resources toward elderly parents speci…cally, it does provide a theoretical jumpingo¤ point to analyze the problem within the context of the public goods literature in the tradition of Bergstrom, Blume and Varian (1986) . If a child cannot be excluded from bene…ting from her parent's well-being and such a good is not diminished by the consumption of her siblings, then the parent's well-being can be thought of as a public good.
2 If parental well-being is a pure public good, then we would expect the best response functions to indicate that siblings'contributions are strategic substitutes. If, however, children's only motivation to contribute is through some preference for personally caring for their parents, referred to as a "warm-glow" in Andreoni (1990) , then there would be no relationship between siblings'contributions as there is essentially no public good channel on which to free ride. Finally, if siblings are competing for their parent's attention, perhaps due to a¤ection or in anticipation of a bequest that may function as a form of payment for services from the child as with Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers'(1985) contributions for the majority of elderly parents who experience a change in contributions. Consequently, policies that promote migration may have a negative impact on the overall well-being of elderly parents. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 illustrates the theoretical model, Section 3 describes the data set, Section 4 establishes the empirical strategy, Section 5 presents the results, Section 6 checks for robustness, Section 7 discusses the simulation, and Section 8 concludes.
Theoretical model
There are two main approaches to the analysis of intrafamily allocations: one that takes the view that the family maximizes a joint utility function and another that focuses on individuals as units of analysis and views family decision-making as a non-cooperative game. This paper takes the latter approach which, it can be argued, is more appropriate for analyzing the relationship between older parents and their adult siblings that are largely independent. Given the high levels of remittances and the importance of networks in the context of migration, some might …nd it more appealing to position the family as unitary decisionmaker rather than the individual. In light of the number of studies rejecting the unitary model of intrahousehold decision-making, however, it seems rea-6 sonable that this class of models would be even less appropriate for describing decision-making by family members who do not co-reside. 3 Another possibility is that siblings take a cooperative approach where they …rst decide on the amount of care that parents should receive and subsequently decide on a division of responsibilities among siblings. Nevertheless, any behavior that is not incentive compatible at the individual level is not likely to persist, so any model of cooperation must include some self-enforcing mechanism.
Also note that the non-cooperative approach does not entirely preclude cooperation among siblings, as children may need to choose between multiple equilibria. This is particularly important when equilibria are Pareto-ranked. In this vein, one criticism of the approach taken here is the suggestion that siblings are likely to interact repeatedly with regard to the care of elderly parents and thus may be able to generate a Pareto-improvement over the non-cooperative, onestage, Nash equilibrium outcome. This type of Folk Theorem result, however, requires the siblings to be su¢ ciently patient with regard to future pay-o¤s, a requirement for which there is no empirical evidence to support or refute.
Thus, the model presented here, while not the only possible approach, can be thought of as one way of analyzing siblings' interaction that is also valid and informative.
I begin by specifying a two-stage game in which individuals make decisions about migration, m i 2 f0; 1g in the …rst stage, and subsequently decide on the amount of (private) consumption, c i , and their contributions to their parents in terms of time, t i , and material goods, g i , with the objective of maximizing utility less some cost of migration,
decreasing function of the number of migrant siblings in the family, M i = (m 1 ; :::; m i 1 ; m i+1 ; ::; m n ); and is equal to zero if the individual does not migrate. 4 Thus, the individual maximizes a net utility function:
subject to a binding resource constraint and the restriction that his time contribution must equal zero if he migrates, t i = 0 if m i = 1 . Note the inclusion of other siblings'goods contributions, G i = (g 1 ; :::; g i 1 ; g i+1 ; ::; g n ), and their time contributions, T i = (t 1 ; :::; t i 1 ; t i+1 ; ::; t n ), as well as the individual contributions, t i and g i in the utility function. This allows for the possibility that children care for the well-being of their parents in terms of how much they are cared for by all of their siblings as well as how much they personally provide to their parents. Also note that the utility function depends on some individual characteristics, Z i , which include observable and unobservable components,
As a simpli…cation, we can substitute out for the consumption good using the budget constraint and rewrite the individual's utility as a function of his own time and goods contributions as well as of his siblings' contributions:
Using backward recursion, we begin with an examination of the second stage in which M , the vector of migration decisions made by all siblings in the …rst stage, has been …xed. 5 The individual then solves:
This maximization problem yields the following best response functions for g i and t i which are conditional on the migration decision:
5 Every vector M de…nes a proper subgame. W (X 1 ; :::; X i 1 ; X i+1 ; :::; X n ).
Moving to the …rst stage of the game, individual i will choose to migrate if his net utility is higher as a migrant than as a non-migrant. That is, he chooses
This yields the following best response function for migration:
Solving for the …xed point among all siblings in the family yields the vector M (Z) which maps characteristics of all siblings into migration outcomes.
While it would be instructive to estimate the best response function in equation 3, we would not be able to identify the parameters as we again have an endogeneity problem because of simultaneity, i.e. sibling i's migration is a function of sibling j's migration which in turn is a function of sibling i's migration.
Unfortunately, in this case, all siblings' characteristics enter directly into the best response function and therefore cannot be excluded from the equation to be used as instruments. Nevertheless, we may still estimate the equilibrium
which is a function of all of the siblings' characteristics. This estimation will prove useful in the robustness section below where I address the concerns arising from selection into migration.
Data

Description
The data set used in this paper is the Mexican Health and Aging Study ( For purposes of the analysis presented here, the data set contains detailed information about …nancial transfers between the respondent and his children.
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Information is also provided on the time children spend helping their parents, but these responses are conditional on the respondent's reporting di¢ culty with "Activities of Daily Living" (abbreviated as ADLs) which are divided into basic ADLs and higher level "Instrumental Activities of Daily Living" (IADLs).
8
The basic ADLs involve getting in and out of bed, bathing oneself, using the toilet, eating, and walking across a room. The IADLs involve preparing a hot meal, shopping for groceries, taking medications if needed, and managing money.
Since these are the only measures of hourly time contributions in the study, I
limit my sample to families where the parent reported di¢ culty with at least one ADL or IADL. If respondents report that they simply can not or do not do one of the basic ADLs, I also include them in the sample since these tasks are fundamental to everyday life. If respondents report that they cannot or do not perform one of the IADLs, which may be by choice, I only include them in the sample if they answer yes to a follow-up question that asks whether this di¢ culty is due to a health reason.
Since my sample is conditional on di¢ culties with ADLs or IADLs, and respondents are asked to list the amount of time individuals spend helping them with these tasks, the time contributions made by children in this analysis can be thought of as a measure of critical hourly help. While cutting the sample on this dimension greatly limits the number of observations, focusing on this restricted sample is arguably more appropriate as families with parents with these di¢ culties are likely to di¤er considerably from families where the parent is more independent. 9 Thus, the restricted sample can be thought of as a more ‡exible speci…cation where I have allowed all e¤ects to vary based on the fact that the parent has di¢ culties with one or more activities of daily living. I take the …ve indicators of di¢ culty with the basic ADLs as particularly important indicators of the parent's basic ability to provide for himself and also include them as controls in the regression analysis below.
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The two main variables of interest provide data on time and …nancial contributions by children to parents. The …nancial variable is the result of a series of questions about how much money the child has contributed to the elderly parent over the past 2 years. 11 Most participants that respond make reference to a monthly allotment and for those who do not, I convert the answer into a monthly average. 12 In addition, some participants were not sure of the amount and were allowed to respond with a pre-speci…ed range of values. Using the continuous data as the empirical distribution, I converted these responses to the mean of the range speci…ed. The time contribution variable is the result of asking how many days in the last month and how many hours per day the child spent helping the parent with any ADLs or IADLs. In addition, if a nonresident child's spouse or children helped the elderly respondent, the survey records this time contribution as deriving from the child of the elderly parent, so the time contributions can be viewed more broadly as hourly help ‡owing from the households of the respondent's children. a particularly high attrition rate of close to 75%, which I take to be exogenous to the sibling allocation problem. 1 5 Remarkably, this is the same fraction of current US migrants in the larger sample which is not conditioned on di¢ culty with at least one ADL or IADL.
13 re ‡ects Mexico's rapid increases in educational attainment over that generation.
About 47% of the parents are married. The average number of children which will serve as the siblings in my analysis is close to six. The average number of children who are reported to contribute …nancially to the parent is close to 1, while the average number of children who give help in terms of time is about 0.7. The rest of Panel 1B describes the health of the parent sample. Close to 30% report di¢ culty bathing themselves, 18% have trouble eating, 45% report di¢ culties getting in and out of bed, 31% have di¢ culty using the toilet, and 44% have trouble walking across a room. Around 73% report di¢ culties with at least one of the basic activities of daily life including bathing, eating, walking across the room or using the toilet.
It is also useful to examine the di¤erences in means of characteristics by gender. Table 2 shows that on average sons give a higher amount of money to their parents relative to daughters (196 pesos per month relative to 134) and this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 10% level. At the same time, on average women give more time to their parents relative to men (22.4 hours per month versus about 8.7); this di¤erence is statistically signi…cant at the 1% level. As expected, men are more likely to be U.S. migrants with 13% of men currently in the U.S. whereas only 8% of women are currently in the U.S. Men are also slightly more educated than women, slightly more likely to be married, and have fewer children on average than their sisters, a fact that points to earlier timing of fertility in women. The fact that daughters are more likely to provide physical care and sons more likely to provide …nancial care illustrate the importance of gender-speci…c roles within the family. This is particularly striking given that money and time given by the child's entire family (including husband, wife, and children) are all included in the data corresponding to sons and daughters.
whether parents of migrant children are better o¤ than parents of non-migrant children. Table 3 shows that parents of migrants appear to receive more …nan-cial help from their children compared with parents of non-migrants (on average, about 1200 pesos per month versus about 890), although the high variance in contributions does not allow for a …nding of a statistically signi…cant di¤erence.
The number of siblings per family, however, is signi…cantly larger for families where at least one child is a migrant (on average, 7 siblings versus 5.5.) In terms of hours of help, parents of non-migrant children appear to receive more from their kids than their counterparts with children in the U.S., although the total number of hours is not statistically signi…cant. After taking into account the di¤erence in the number of siblings, however, the result is signi…cantly signi…cant, with parents of non-migrant children receiving an average of 20.6 hours of monthly care from each child relative to 12.5 hours for parents of migrant children.
These descriptive statistics point to signi…cant di¤erences between parental contributions among siblings based on gender and migrant status. where I assume that the contributions of other siblings enter as a sum:
where i is the individual subscript and j denotes the family.
Identi…cation
The main empirical problem is that siblings' contributions are determined simultaneously, and thus are necessarily endogenous. More generally, this can be thought of as an example of the classic re ‡ection problem illustrated in Manski (1993) , wherein the behavior of an individual both a¤ects and is a¤ected by the behaviour of a reference group, in this case, his siblings. As Manski points out, it is di¢ cult to tease out the causal e¤ect of the group behavior on the behavior of the individual, because of the presence of endogenous, contextual, and correlated e¤ects within the group.
In equations 5 through 7 above, it is straightforward to show that G i;j will be correlated with u ij since G i;j is also a function of g ij . The analog is true for all the variables comprising siblings' …nancial contributions as well as time contributions, T i;j . As a result, least squares estimation violates the classical assumptions and will lead to biased and inconsistent estimates.
An added problem is that the decision to migrate may be in ‡uenced by the same factors that a¤ect the parental contribution. For now, I treat migration status as predetermined and consider potential migration selection issues in the robustness section below.
Instrumental variables
To address the endogeneity of siblings'contributions, I propose a set of instruments that are excluded from equations 5 through 7 but that help to predict the endogenous variables G i;j and T i;j . These are simply the sibling's characteristics, X ij , since they help to predict G i;j and T i;j but are not included directly in the equations determining g ij ; t ij . The identi…cation assumption is that siblings' characteristics only a¤ect individual i's contributions through G i;j and T i;j .
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In the language of Manski (1993) , this requires assuming away the existence of contextual and correlated e¤ects that re ‡ect the exogenous characteristics of other siblings in the group, i.e., these variables must correctly be excluded from the individual contribution equation. At …rst this may appear to be a point of contention as we might expect for an individual's contribution decision to take his siblings'characteristics into account. For example, one might expect a child to contribute more if his brother was poorly educated and presumably less able to contribute. However, the important assumption here is that the individual's behavior responds to the contributions of his siblings, and not directly to his siblings'characteristics. In short, when the individual decides on his parental contribution it does not matter why his siblings are contributing to the extent that they are, it only matters how much they are actually contributing.
In the simple 2-sibling family, it is easy to see that the instrumental variables are just the personal characteristics of the other sibling. In a many-sibling family it would be some aggregate function of the other siblings'characteristics.
In particular, I use the sum of siblings'characteristics which can be motivated through some reduced-form algebra.
Consider a 3-sibling household with one public good. Substituting G 1;j = g 2;j + g 3;j , G 2;j = g 1;j + g 3;j , and G 3;j = g 1;j + g 2;j yields:
Solving the system of equations for g 3j as a function of exogenous variables leaves us with the following reduced form equation for g 3jk : The estimation strategy thus amounts to estimation of equations 5 through 7 where I account for the endogeneity of siblings'contributions by estimating:
Estimation
Due to a high fraction of zeros in both time and …nancial contributions, a tobit speci…cation would be most appropriate for estimating equations 5 through 7. The standard maximum likelihood estimation, however, is computationally di¢ cult due to the inclusion of multiple endogenous variables. Instead, I use two-step estimation inspired by Rivers and Vuong (1988) and Blundell and Smith (1986) , as detailed in Wooldridge (2002) . The …rst step amounts to estimation of equations 12 through 13 via OLS and then inserting estimated residuals from those regressions into tobit estimation of equations 5 through 7. I bootstrap the standard errors, clustering at the family level, using 500
replications. From these estimates, I compute the average partial e¤ects of interest evaluated at the mean values of the covariates, which, for continuous variable x k ij in equation 5 take the form: is the estimated error variance from the second-stage regression. The procedure for estimating equations 6 and 7 and …nding the resulting average partial e¤ects is analogous.
Results
Under the assumption of no endogeneity
Before presenting the results from the instrumental variables estimation, it is instructive to examine the results from a regression that neglects to account for the endogeneity of siblings'contributions. The results from a tobit estimation of the best response functions are shown in Table 4 
Best response functions
While the endogeneity problem casts doubt on a causal interpretation of the results in Table 4 , the IV strategy I propose relies critically on the validity of the instruments used. To address this, I present …rst-stage results in Table 5 where the dependent variables are the sums of the siblings' contributions and the regressors are the sums of the siblings'characteristics presented in the empirical section above. As expected, the number of sisters is negatively related to the sum of siblings'contributions, but is positively related to the total hours siblings spend helping parents. A higher number of younger siblings is also negatively associated with the siblings'…nancial contribution, a …nding that is also as expected. In addition, the number of siblings in the highest education group has a positive e¤ect on …nancial contributions while the number of siblings in the lower education group has a positive e¤ect on siblings'hourly contributions.
Marriage has an appreciable negative impact on …nancial contributions, consistent with the notion that married people shift their …nancial focus to their own immediate families and away from their parents. Nevertheless, the number of children is a positive predictor of …nancial contributions and a negative predictor of hourly help, perhaps because the care of children requires people to shift time away from caring for their parents, a shift which they may compensate for 20 with increased …nancial contributions. 19 Most of these coe¢ cient estimates are signi…cant at the 1% level, re ‡ecting the predictive power of the instrumental variables individually. In addition, the F stat on the excluded instruments, a commonly used diagnostic for detecting weak instruments, is above 10 in all regressions, indicating the strength of the set of instrumental variables. Table 6 shows the average partial e¤ects from estimating the best response functions with the two-step tobit estimator described above.
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Column (1) shows that a 100 peso increase in siblings'contributions leads to a 10 peso in- could point to the possibility that children expect their parents will mainly consider …nancial contributions when they make bequest decisions at the ends of their lives.
Robustness 6.1 Intrafamily correlation
One concern about the instrumental variables strategy employed here is the possibility that since the instruments are based on siblings'characteristics, they may in fact be capturing some heterogeneity at the family level that is correlated The instrumental variables-…xed e¤ects strategy is employed a great deal in the spatial regression literature to estimate strategic interaction among governments. Anselin (2002) and Brueckner (2003) provide overviews of the empirical issues and literature. Fredriksson and Millimet (2002) consider an application with regard to environmental policy. 2 2 Of course, some averages of the instrumental variables will not be estimable because of collinearity, such as the average number of i's siblings, which will be constant equal to
where n is the number of siblings.
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With this strategy, the siblings' characteristics used as instruments will only help predict siblings' total contributions insofar as they o¤er some predictive power beyond that of the family mean.
The results from the best response functions including the within-family averages are presented in Table 7 , which shows a pattern of results similar to the estimation without the family-level averages. Column (1) 
Selection into migration 6.2.1 Econometric model with selection
Thus far, I have been operating under the assumption that migration is predetermined and ignoring any possible selection issues. However, if migration status and the unobservable component of contributions were somehow correlated, dividing the sample by migration status would introduce a selection term 23 into the best response functions. For instance, we might be concerned that migrants emerge from a group of people who are not close to their families, so they are more likely to migrate and give less to their parents.
Estimation of the best response functions must therefore address the omitted selection term. In the case of the time contribution equation, which is only observed when the individual is a non-migrant, we actually observe
where I have de…ned q(X ij ; G i;j ; T i;j ; m ij ) = E(e ij jX ij ; G i;j ; T i;j ; m ij ) and % ij = e ij E(e ij jX ij ; G i;j ; T i;j ; m i;j ):
Note that by de…nition, E(% ij jX ij ; G i;j ; T i;j ; m i;j ) = 0. As with the Heckman two-step procedure, we can …nd an estimator for q(X ij ; G i;j ; T i;j ; m ij ) 
where 1 is the indicator function.
While migration does not a¤ect the observability of …nancial contributions, estimating equations 5 and 6 separately for migrants and non-migrants also requires the inclusion of a selection term to account for the split sample. Thus, to address the possibility of a correlation between selection into migration and child's contribution, I include the selection term for migration or non-migration into each best response function as appropriate. Because of the non-linear tobit estimation, the most appropriate way to account for selection into migration would be via maximum likelihood. The selection problem coupled with the multiple endogenous variables, however, makes maximum likelihood estimation intractable. Instead, I present the results with the selection term from the IV linear regressions of best response functions which amount to:
where
(Z) are the estimated inverse Mills' ratio terms associated with migration and non-migration, respectively, from probit estimation of equation 16.
Results accounting for selection
The results from probit estimation of equation 16 can be found in Table 8 .
Overall, it appears that both individual and siblings'characteristics play a role in determining the probability of migration. From the theoretical model, this makes sense since the individual characteristics are partially accounting for the continuation values of …nancial and time contributions across siblings. One important characteristic predicting migration appears to be the number of sisters, which decreases the probability of migrating, perhaps because there are fewer migrant siblings in the family as a result raising the relative cost of migration.
Another signi…cant variable is the birth order of siblings which is negatively related to migration meaning the more younger siblings and individual has, the less likely he is to migrate. In addition, the number of siblings has a positive e¤ect on migration, as expected, since migrants are more likely to come from larger families. The predictive power of the individual and siblings'variables lends credibility to the use of this model to estimate the inverse Mills' ratios instrumental to accounting for selection into migration.
The results from the IV linear regressions accounting for selection and endogeneity of contributions can be found in Table 9 7 Do parents receive more contributions as a result of a child' s migration?
Simulation
The question remains whether parents will receive more or less contributions as a result of a child's migration. Having estimated best response functions for migrants and non-migrants separately allows me to solve the best response functions simultaneously and obtain the equilibrium contributions which represent the …xed point. To do this, I begin by considering a two-sibling family where the eldest sibling is a potential migrant. Taking the median characteristics for the two siblings and drawing an error term for each, the policy question is whether the estimated best response functions predict a higher total time contribution for the elderly parent when one sibling migrates or when both stay home. An analogous policy question concerns whether the elderly parent receives a higher total …nancial contribution from his children when one migrates or when both stay home.
The simulation works as follows. After establishing the median characteristics for the two children in the family, I draw a sample of 500 errors from a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance equal to that found in the sample populations based on the estimated standard deviations from the three best re- Table 10 presents the results from the simulation for a family of two brothers as well as a family of one sister and one brother. Panel A shows that of the 500 hypothetical families in the simulation, the average di¤erence in …nancial contributions received by the parent as a result of migration is about -261, meaning that, on average, the parent receives more when both his children are in Mexico than when one child migrates. 26 In addition, we can reject the null 2 5 In practice, I de…ne convergence to be achieved if the predicted value of the younger sibling's contribution is within 1 peso of the guess for his …nancial contribution and within 0.1 hour of his time contribution. The revised guess is de…ned to be half of the di¤erence between the guess and the predicted value. 2 6 The di¤erence is calculated as the total contribution received by the parent when one child migrates less the total contribution received by the parent when neither child migrates. …nancial contributions using only observable variables are predicted to be higher when one child migrates. Nevertheless, the importance of the error term cannot be understated as the variance of the error distribution is larger for non-migrants than for migrants. 27 Since contributions are constrained to be greater than or equal to zero, the larger variance in the distribution of the error term for nonmigrants implies a higher value of …nancial contributions when children are nonmigrants. One explanation for the higher variance for non-migrants relative to migrants is that parents in the home country may more readily lean on children that are present when they face a temporary health shock. In contrast, children who are out of the country may be more likely to send constant amounts to their parents, and as a result we see a smaller variance in the error distribution for migrants. Consequently, we see that despite the relationship between siblings' …nancial and time contributions, parents of migrants are likely to receive less in terms of both time and money as a result of one child's migration than they would have if both children stayed in the home country.
Simulation Results
Conclusion
The results from estimating the best response functions for children's contributions toward their elderly parents show that (1) 
